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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

1'111:- i:-; an adion by

KPnnPeott <·rnployPf'H to
·,,1 r da111ag1•:-; from dPfrndants for brPach of contract
! 1·r ··:wl1 of t'id11<'iary dutiPs, arising out of writt<m
·I •ral promisPs to pay strikP henPfits to plaintiffs
'"1"' tht· 1%i-(iS strikl' at KPnnP<'Ott C'oppn Corpora1' - 1·tali propPrtiPs, whieh promises defendants rP. . I!,, 1'1ilfill.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOvVER COUR'l1
The case was tried to the court without a jury, and
the court rendered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in
the aggregate sum of $220,278, together with intt'rest
thereon and costs. The ruling of the lower court was
based upon its findings of fact and conclusions of law
filed and entered herein. (R. 579-595)
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants-appellants seek a reversal of the
lower court's judgment in favor of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs.
respondents respectfully seek to have this court affim1
the lower court's decision in all respects and to grant
respondents their costs on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the fall of 1966, defendants commenced an organizational campaign among the l'mployees of Kennecott
Copper Corporation ("Kennecott") designed to attract
plaintiffs and other Kennecott employees into membership in the defendant unions. (R. 396)
As part of this organizational campaign, the defendants through their various officers, including International officers, general organizers and other authorized representatives, repeatedly represented, promised.
and guaranteed to plaintiffs, both orally and in writing,
that they would receive strike benefits, varying from
$90.00 to $150.00 per month per man, in the event the:·
joined defendants and a strike occurred at Kennecott. '
(R. 396 and Exhibits P-1, page 195, and P-54)
1

2

During at least the final three months of this organizational campaign, authorized representatives of defendants represented to plaintiffs that they would be paid
these strike benefits regardless of the outcome of the
forthcoming representational election, held June 20, 21,
1967. (R. 397)

Plaintiffs, induced by and in reliance upon these and
ntltPr reprt>sentations and guarantees, and particularly
those regarding strike benefits, joined as members of
defendants and thereafter performed all obligations and
rluties required of members, including payment of dues,
attmdance at meetings and service of picket duty. (R .
.)97 and Exhibits 8, 11, 16, 18, 21 and 51)
From July 15, 1967, to March 29, 1968, plaintiffs,
among other Kennecott employees, engaged in a strike
at the Kennecott properties in Utah, which strike was
authorized and engaged in by defendants and other
unions at Kennecott. (R. 397 and Exhibit P-138)
Shortly after the commencement of this strike at
Kt>nnecott, the plaintiffs were included, among all memhern of Local 844, on a strike payroll submitted to defrndant Brotherhood for the payment of promised strike
henefits; but plaintiffs were stricken from this strike
pavroll by H. E. Gilbert, Brotherhood President, and
\\We refused any promised strike benefits whatever from
rMendants. (R. 763-764 and Exhibits P-78 and P-79)
Defendants throughout the above-mentioned strike
period paid full strike benefits to all members of Lodge
3

844 other than plaintiffs, which persons had joined that
lodge prior to the 1966-67 organizational campaign. (R.
917-939 and Exhibits P-79 to 84)
At no time did defendants disqualify any member
from receiving such strike benefits because of any outside earnings during the strike period; nor did defendants make any inquiry concerning the outside earning,
of those members receiving strike benefits during
particular strike. (R. 158, 215, 879, 898, 929, and
POINT I
THE FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH
JUDGMENT BELOW IS BASED ARE AMPLY
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
1. The Evidence Supports the Finding that the
Plaintiff Oliver was a Member of the B.L.F. & E.

The defendants contend that there is no evidence
in the record to support the finding that the plaintiff
Steven James Oliver was a member of the defendant
unions at the time of the strike involved in this suit.
Since he had been left off the initial B.L.:F'. & E. strih
payroll, Exhibit P-78, Oliver was called as a witnt'ss !Ci
clarify his membership position, and to avoid the Hry
rontention now made by defendants.
Oliver testified that, at the urging of Warren D.
Cole, chairman of the defendant local, he signed
necessary papers and joined the defendants in l\Iay,
1967. (R. 1073) At that time he executed an application '
for membership in the B.L.F. & E. (Exhibit P-139) anrl
4

releasing him from membership in his previ11118 muon, the Mine, Mill and Smelter \Yorkers.
(R.
J\l7J) Ulivt>r testified that he was at that time shown
:i eop>· of the B.L.F. & E. Constitution and was told
li,\ Cok that, as a member of the B.L.F. & E, he would
n·cein strike benefits whether the forthcoming union
d(·ction was won or lost by the B.L.F. & E. (R. 1074)
()Jiyer further testified that, upon commencement of the
h>nnerott strike, he performed picket duties for the
B.L.F. & K (R. 1076)
n statement

At no time prior to commencement of this action

(li!l the B.L.F. & E. raise any question as to whether
(JJi\·er was qualified as a member to receive B.L.F. & E.
:-trike twnefits. The union accepted his services on the
1iekd lim·, and when he inquired of Cole why he had
1
not heen paid strike benefits, all Cole stated was "The
(;rand Lodge has renigged on their contract, and you
1rnn't get any." (R. 1076)
Tlw defendants contend that the records in evidence
no payment of dues by Oliver to the B.L.F. & E.
: ln the contrary, the lower court granted leave to the
dd"t>ndants to try to support this contention at the trial
i'rnm dues payment records maintained by Kennecott,
anrl the defendants failed to offer any such records.
:n. 1072, 1079)
rl'he record is clear that Oliver joined the B.L.F. & E.
in the same manner as all of the other plaintiffs. The
in which Oliver's situation differs frorn the
0 11 1P1 plaintiffs is that he was erroneously excluded from
5

the initial strike payroll, Exhibit P-78. At least 011 v
other paintiff, B. L. Uliberri, was also erroneously PX
c]uded from P-78, and the defendants nevertheless stipn.
lated that he was a member in good standing of t]lf,.
B.L.F. & E. (R. 1060)
-

2. The Evidence Supports the Finding That the
Plaintiff Esquival is a Proper Party Plaintiff.

Defendants assert that the plaintiff Herbierto Esquival is not entitled to recover damages in this action
because he did not timely intervene as a plaintiff. It
is true that Esquival was not included on plaintiffs'
list of intervenors filed May 24, 1968. (R. 232) Howenr,
on that day plaintiffs sought by motion and were grantPd
a one-week extension, to May 31, 1968, for the joinder
of further plaintiffs in the action. (R. 229) On May :n, :
1968, interrogatory answers of Esqui val wer<' fih·d and
served on the defendants. (R. 251-253) Plaintiffs' counsel, through simple oversight, failed to include Esquival
on a supplemental Notice of Joinder. However, at the
time of filing of Esquival's answers, it was expressly
stated therein that each plaintiff filing said
including Esquival, should be added to Exhibit A to the i
plaintiffs' original answers. (R. 242) That Exhibit A,
in response to defendants' interrogatories, :"Pt forth
those persons who had authorized this action and who
intended to be plaintiffs in the action. Plaintiff EsqniYai
was included in that category just the same as all otltrr
plaintiffs, and defendants had knowledge of that fart
1

1

Defendants made no objection to the extension
sought by plaintiffs for further intervention, and they
6

ade 110 objection to the filing or content of Esquival's
interrogatory answers. Esquival, like all of the plaintiffs hPrein, had been promised strike benefits by defrn<lants, was in all respects properly within the class
of plaintiffs involved and fully answered the interrogatories propounded to him by defendants. (R. 251-253)
Having been given practical notice of Esquival's joinder
a plaintiff, and having made no objection thereto,
defendants waived any objection they might have had
to Esqnival's participation in the damage award in this
aetion.
111

3. The Evidence Supports the Finding that the
Defendants Placed No Condition Other Than
Membership on the Payment of Strike Benefits.

ThP defendants state that the Constitution of the
13.L.F. & E. itself ''prohibits the granting of strike benefits to members not in the bargaining unit represented
b: the union." (Def. Brief, p. 6) For that proposition,
tlw Court is referred to pages 195-199 of the B.L.F. & E.
Constitution, Exhibit P-1. There is absolutely no refert·nce whatever in pages 195-199 of Exhibit P-1 to a
"bargaining nnit represented by the union," let alone
any provision which would limit the payment of strike
lit"nefits to persons within such a unit. On the contrary,
tlw provisions cited even provide for the payment of
benefits to non-members, as well as members. (Art.
10, Sec. 3(a) and (b), p. 195, Exhibit P-1)
Then• is a clear record in this case that strike beni'fits we-re in no way conditioned upon a person's job
rlassification or bargaining unit. L. L. Iman, who was
7

in charge of the B.L.F. & E. organizational cainpai[)"n
tl'stified that persons outside the B.L.E,. & E.
unit had been solicited for membership and told
they would, upon joining, qualify for B.L.F. & E. strih
benefits. (R. 1206) Further, the record discloses that
in prior Kennecott strikes, the B.L.F. & E. vaid strih
benefits to persons who were not within the bargaining
unit represented by the B.L.F. & E. (R. 926)

1

I

The record in this case is replete with documentary
evidence and testimony to the effect that the B.L."B'. & E.
and its representatives at no time during the organizational campaign conditioned the payment of strike henefits upon B.L.F. & E. success in that campaign or
subsequent election or upon any factor other than nwmbership in the defendant unions. (R. G89, Fairbanks;
R 869, 871, 877,, Oneida; R. 901-902, Lawson; R. 976977, Hansen; R. 1043, Yates; R. 1048, \Veichert; R.1141,
Trujillo; R. 1200, 1210, 1217, Iman; R. 1233, 1241, ColP, ,
and Exhibits P-8, 16, 17, 18 21 54 62 and 65)
Even before all the evidence was in, the defendants
stipulated that from March 24, 1967, and for a period of
some three months thereafter, the B.L.F. & K and it'
representatives represented to the plaintiff that they
would be paid strike benefits if they were members in
good standing and voted for the B.L.F. & E. at thl'
NLRB election regardless of the outcome of the election.
(R. 1061) Defendants further stipulated that certain
written "flyers" were circulated to plaintiffs which statPd
that strike benefits would be paid to members regardless of the election results. (R. 670-671)
8

i

1

TLPrl'aftcr, during the course of tlw trial, A. 11.
Oilbert, president of B.L.F. & E. admitted that he knew
thRt tJw 13.L.F. & E. representatiYes were promising
otrike benefits to the plaintiffs and that he did not
instrud them to condition that promise upon anything
otlwr than joining the union. (R. 782-783) L. L. Iman
l'orroborated the matter by his testimony that he re('a!led no one in the Grand Lodge ever telling him that
there was any condition upon the payment of strike
lwnefits otlwr than joining the B.L.F. & E. (R. 1217)
4. The Evidence Supports the Finding that Representations and Promises of Strike Benefits
were made by Authorized Representatives of
Defendants.

Contrary to the assertion in defendants' brief that
L. L. Iman "arrogated to himself" the authority for
carrying on the F tah organizational campaign of the
B.L.F. & E., the defendants at trial admitted that there
\\Pre no \es:-; than thirty-eight B.L.F. & E. field repregeneral organizers and special organizers inYolrl:'d in that campaign. (R. 739-7 40 and Exhibit P-53)
TliosP organizers, under Art. 2, Sec. 8 of the B.L.F. & E.
C'umditution, had the express dutie-s of soliciting new
illf·rnbers, taking application fees and making daily reto the International President of the work perf\1rn1l'd by them. (Exhibit P-1, pp. 43-44)
record in this case clearly supports the propo:>ition that th0 entirf' Utah organizational campaign was
(·rmeeind, commenced. and carried out with the knowl, ,\g(', arnl pnrsnant to authority of, the defendant Inter9

national. The details of the Utah organizational calllpaign were initially outlined at a Grand Lodge meeting
at Lake Tahoe, Nevada, in September 1966. (R. 57-:'iS
and Exhibit P-85) H. E. Gilbert, B.L.F. & E. President ,
engaged his brother-in-law, L. L. Iman, on a "special
assignment" to run the Utah organizational campaign.
(R. 58 and Exhibit P-89A) The various general and
special organizers of the B.L.F. & E. were told to contact Iman on their arrival in Salt Lake City. (Exhihit8
P-111, 112, 123) Gilbert assigned B.L.F. & E. field representative Morelli to relieve Iman temporarily in February, 1967 as head of the Utah organizational campaign
(Exhibits P-106, 107) and it was Morelli who informed
Gilbert by letter that an unconditional promise of strih
benefits to all members, regardless of job classification,
had been made from the very beginning of the campaign.
(Exhibit P-41)
E. F. Brehany, International Vice President, who
attended the March 24, 1967 debate and took no excPption to the representation made there that B.L.F. & E.
strike benefits would be paid regardless of the election
outcome, was sent to that debate on express orders of
the International president. (R. 1198 and Exhibit P-110)
There is abundant evidence that, throughout the organizational campaign, L. L. Iman reported in detail on the
progress of that campaign to Gilbert, the International
President. (R. 1191-1193 and Exhibits P-85 to P-135)
Iman testified that he called to Gilbert's attention, either
orally or in writing, every matter of significance in the
campaign. (R. 1196) Even as early as November 21,
1966, Iman sent Gilbert copies of the handbills and flyers

10

used in the campaign. (Exhibit P-93) Not only
did Gilbert have knowledge that strike benefits were
being promised to prospective new members in Utah,
lnit J1e personally arranged for Iman to be provided with
the details of all strike benefits paid to members of
Lodge S-14 in prior years, so that that information could
be rn;ed as a recruiting tool. (Exhibit P-109)
r_r11e defendant International paid all expenses of

the Utah organizational campaign, which expenses totalled $63,569.80. (R. 737 and Exhibit P-47) ,Certain of
tlw handbills and flyers which promised strike benefits
wen' in fact prepared by the B.L.F. & E. in Cleveland,
Ohio, and transmitted to Utah for circulation in the
eampaign. (R. 758-759, 1103, 1104, and Exhibits P-54,
GU, and 70) E. F. Brehany, Vice President of the B.L.F.
b., actively involved himself in circulating to prospective new members flyers containing strike benefits (R.
1109-1110), and R. J. Whitlock, a member of the Board
of Directors of the B.L.F. & E., also participated actively
in organizational efforts, including the circulation of
ben<.:>fit materials. (R. 1136-1137)
Even assuming arguendo that L. L. Iman did not
have actual authority to make the promises he admittedly
made with respect to strike benefits, the record is clear
that Iman had apparent authority to rnake those repreIman assured all Grand Lodge representatives, local lodge members and officers "on many occao-ions" that the payment of strike benefits to all who
had joined the B.L.F. & E. had been "cleared and approved by President H. E. Gilbert by telephone." (Ex11

hibit P-8) The president of the defendant local sail!
that he was told "time after time" that the International
President had cleared or given approval to the procedures and statement::; employed in tlw organizational
campaign. (Exhibit P-51) He further indicated that ht
had the impression "that the drive was being conducted
with Grand Lodge approval of all facet::; involwd and
that I should not question the authority of those in
charge." (Exhibit P-51) Iman expressly reqne::;ted authority from the International President to promise all
new members that they would receive strike lwnefits,
and Gilbert gave him that as::;urance, which was then
incorporated in a handbill circulated among plaintiffs.
(R. 756-757 and Exhibits P-41 and D-1G2-Hi3)
In one handbill circulated among and rt>lit>d upon
by plaintiffs, it was expressly represented by the Grie\'ance Committee of Lodge 844 that it::; members had
personally spoken to International Pre::;idPnt Gilbert
about B.L.F. & K benefits and had lw<'n adyised tliat
Gilbert was "giving the whole matter hi::; personal guidance." (R. 1201-1202 and Exhibits P-159 and D-1 ±-I-) On"
of the most widely distributed flyers nsed hy tlw B.L.F.
& E. in its campaign was a bogus $100 hill Pntitled
"B.L.F. & E. Money" and containing tltt> pidnre of it'
International President. That flyer iwrtaintid :-:olelY !11
strike benefits, and said such benefits wPrP not men\lY
promised but were "guaranteed." (Exhibit P-60)

1

1

Even if one were to disregard the obvious apparent
authority of L. L. Iman to bind the B.L.F. & K at tlw '
time he acted, it is clear that thoise acts were implied!)
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iatifiP<l liy tlw Urand LodgP m all respPcb;. (R. 1189,

Ull. 12:l:!, 123:3)
:5. The Evidence Supports the Finding That the
Plaintiffs Beck, D. P. Bennett, Glen Bennett,
Carter, James, Kendrick, Tsutsui, Gale and T.
N. Turner are Entitled to Recover Strike Beneits.

AftN granting defendant:'' motion to dismiss the
action a:-: against a numbPr of plaintiffs who had failed
to retain coimsf'I and int<>rvPm' as parties in the action,
the trial eonrt rnaclc the following ruling with regard to
tlw ninP afon•rn1111Pd plaintiffs, who defrndants contt•nded
:-:l1011ld Jw dismissed for failure to timely file interroga-

TlH: COURT: [T j}w motion as to B(•ck, D.
H<·nnett, (;. Bemiett, Carkr, James, Kt>ndrick,
T:-:ntsni. Oal<' and Turner will he denied, ho\\·ever,
if upon tlH• termination of this trial, that is, both
partiPs n•stinp; tlH•ir cas<', defendant can show any
pn·.indic<·, the Court \\·ill n•(·onsider said motion
or <li:-;missal. ( H.
Plaintiff n•:-;kd its <·as<' on JnnP :23, 19G8 and dPfPnda11b l'<'sted tlwir casP on fop next day. (R. 1148,
UGG) At tlH· time deft>ndants rested, they made no
nttPmpt whakv('r to show any prejudice caused them
L1· tlw failnn· of said nine plaintiffs to file interrogatory
in thP matter.
DPft>ndants state, at pagP S of their brief, "As the
n•<·onl starnls, it is eompl0tPly devoid of any evidencp
.1. liabop\·er with
r<>gard to these plaintiffs." On thP

contrary, these plaintiffs were not excluded from the <le.
fendants' stipulation, made at the commencement of trial '
that strike benefits were promised to all persons
'
licited for B.L.F. & E. membership during its organiza.
tional campaign. (R. 671) These nine plaintiffs were
included on the initial roster of members qualified for 1
strike benefits, and each signed that ro ste'r. (Exhibit
P-75) They were also included on a list specifying tJw
number of dependents each member had, which was nst><l
in calculating the amount of strike benefits due. (Ex.
hib P-76) They were also included on the initial strih
payroll duly approved by the officials of the B.L.F. &K
(Exhibit P-78)
1

1

The uncontroverted evidence in this case is that the
promise of strike benefits was made to all plaintiffs,
including these nine plaintiffs. (Exhibits P-8, 16, Ji,
18, 21, 41 and 51) The defendants have interrogated all
other plaintiffs, eithrr at the trial or by written interrogatories, as to their reliance upon the promisPs of
strike benefits made to them. (R. 148, 178, 220, 299, 321.
344, 353, 364, 372, 386, 456 and Interrogatories Nos. 50,
51, 54, 55, 62, 63, and 64, and the answPrs thereto, H.
128-129 and 245 et seq.) Defendants cannot cite a single
instance where a plaintiff did not join the B.L.F. & K
in reliance, in part at least, upon such an offer of strike
benefits. In light of that record, it would be complete!)'
unresaonable to assume that any of these
having obviously been made the same promises, failed
to rely upon the same in joining the defendant
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'I'lwse plaintiffs, like all the others, ·were injured as
. ·p:,;ult of the defendants' breach of contract and of
d I.
ti.1e fiduciary duties owed them, and there is no good
l'Pason to exclude them from participation in the damage
award of the trial court.
6. The Evidence Supports the Findings that the
Promises of Strike Benefits Were Made
Throughout the Period of the Organizational
Campaign.

Defendants have constn1cted an elaborate argument
against a contract recovery here, based upon the faulty
premise that since many of the plaintiffs joined the
union prior to a certain date when defendants admit they
were making "guarantees" of strike benefits, those plaintiffs cannot be said to have joined in response to those
gnarantees and promises. However, defendants' argument completely disregards the abundant documentary
t•vidence and testimony at trial to the effeet that such
unconditional in·ornises and guarantees were made not
on!:, after a certain date, but were made repeatedly by
thP defrndants throughout the entirt> course of the organizational campaign, from October, 1966, to June, 1967.
li-lel' Exhibits P-1, 11, 21, 41, 51 72 and 140)
The record discloses that the organizational campaign cornmencf>d in early October 1966. (Exhibits P-85
to 91) .T oseph Trujillo, one of the B.L.F. & E. special
testified that he actively solicited new memhPr::; during the latter months of 1966 as well as the first
six months of 1967. (R. 1096-1097) The reeord is clear
tiint various general organizers of the B.L.F. & E. par-

15

bcipated actively in the organizational campaign fr 1,111
December, 1966 on, and that each one of them repeatedly
represented and promised to the plaintiffs that, if thei
joined the B.L.F. & E., they would be entitled to l'ecei 1;,
strike benefits in the event of a strike. (R. 1097 1101,·
1136; Exhibits P-8, 11, 16, 18, 21, 41, and 51)
)

I

L. L. Iman, the B.L.F. & E. repn•sentative in chargp
of the campaign, was questioned "from the very beginning" by one of the B.L.F. & E. general organizel's ahout
lman's representation that all full dues paying members,
regardless of job status, would be paid strike be11efits.
(Exhibit P-41)
rrhat defendant's representatives informed plantifh
throughout the entire organizational period that all members would receive strike benefits regardless of thl' rrsults of the election is most profoundly established by
the interrogatory answers of 57 of the plaintiffs that
such a promise was made to them before the <lPhatf'
of March 24, 1967. (R. 245 et seq.)
Defendants contend that Exhibit P-54, attached m:
Exhibit B to the Court's finding number nine,, was not
distributed until after February 1, 1967, aud that, as a
i esult, the promise contained therein could only be the
basis of a contract behveen the defendants and those
plaintiffs joining the union after that date. This assertion again disregards the uncontroverted testimon)· of
Joseph Trujillo, who prepared most of the1 handbills and
flyer material utilized in the organizational rampaign, ,
that Exhibit P-54 was "more widely distrihnfrd tlurn an(
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distrihukd "many, many times throughout the
11111/)0l.rJll." (R. 1137-1138)

i11

l)
'I
·1·
11

'

Finally, defendants' contention that it was not until
:iiti·r February 1, 1967, that promises of strike benefits
rnadP to tlw plaintiff::-; even disregards the stipulaof n•cord ht>rein that tlw B.L.F. & E. representaprorni:sed strike bPnefits to tht• plaintiffs "during
rlii· iwriod of the campaign commencing in September
11f rnii() and through .Jnnp 20th, 1967." (R. 671and1060lilli1)

7. The Evidence Supports the Finding that the
Plaintiffs were Engaged in a Strike Authorized
by the B.L.F. & E.

Tlw ddendants contend that the plaintiffs ,,·pn• not
engaged in a strike at Kennecott which was authorized
l1y tlw B.L.F. & E. Certainly there can be no question
that the plaintiffs werP engaged in a strike. (R. 1061)
Thns the only qpsution is whether that strike was authorw·d liy th<· B.L.F'. & E. II. K Gilbert, PrPsidPnt of the
Juternational, issuPd the strike call of Kennecott. (R.
Contrary to his kstirnony that he called a strike
11t thotSe men in the bargaining unit represented by the
H.L.F. & E. (R. 794-795), Gilbert's actual strike authorization, in thP form of a telegram to Mr. E. F. Brehany,
11ns not so limited, and expressl)· granted authority for
111
d.i!;t'
and its nwmbers to go on strike effective July
L\ 1%7. (Exhibit P-138) Plaintiffs were, of course,
of 1,odge 844 and were therefore included in
!liat strih call.
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All members of Lodge 844, including th(} plaintiffs,
were notified by their lodge officers of the strike ca]]
and all were told to report for B.L.F. & E. picket duty,
(R. 141-142) Defendants stipulated that the
reported to the B.L.F. & E. strike headquarters and
signed for and served picket duty for the B.L.F. & R
(R. 1061) The plaintiffs, while serving such picket duty
'I
carried a placard announcing they were on strike on
behalf of the B.L.F. & E. (Exhibit P-73)
I

Defendants' statement in its brief that the plaintiffs
were authorized to go on strike by the Mine-Mill Union
is competely unsupported. On the contrary, the defendants by interrogatory asked the plaintiffs whether they
were called out on strike by the Mine-Mill or any union
other than the B.L.F. & E., and plaintiffs ovenvhelm
ingly answered in the negative. (Defendants' Interrogatoeirs 12, 33 and 35, R. 124, 126 and answers thereto,
R. 245 et seq.)
8. The Evidence Supports the Finding that the
Plaintiffs Were Initially Included on a Duly
Certified and Authorized B.L.F. & E. Strike
Payroll.

The defendants contend that Exhibit P-78, the initial strike payroll, was not a valid and duly authorized
payroll. To the contrary, nothing in this record is mon
clear than the validity of that payroll under the <lefen<lants' own rules pertaining thereto.
The defendant B.L.F. & E., in its Constitution (.\rt.
10, Sec. 3 (f), (g) and (h)) specifically sets forth tlw
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mechanics for proper approval of a strike payroll. Those
constitutional provisions state that bank payroll forms
an' to br filled out by the local lodge, certified by the
president, local chairman and recording secretary, approved by the Chairman of the General Grievance Comlllittee and tht> Grand Lodge representative assigned to
take chargr of the strike, and then forwarded to the
Seerdary and Treasurer of the B.L.F. & E. for
issuanee of strike benefit checks. (Exhibit P-1, p. 197)
The record in this case shows that all requisites for
roper certification and approval of the payroll were
11
with in every respect. The Local Lodge 844
rPeeiwd blank
forms; the names of all striking
employees, including all plaintiffs except Messrs. Oliver,
('. Turner and Uliberri, were entered therPon, with the
number of dependents for each employee and the amount
of strikt> benefits due each set opposite his respective
name. (Exhibit P-78) This was done by Martin Jensen,
financial Recretary of Lodge 844. (R. 918) The strike
Jiayroll, Exhibit P-78, with the names of the plaintiffs
i11clndt>d with the three exceptions noted, was certified
11" tlw PresidP-nt (Yoylt> M. Fairbanks), Local Chairman (Warren D. Cole) and Recording Secretary of Local
"44 (Glen R. Draper). P-78 was then forwarded to the
Chairman of the General Grievance Committee (Warren
n Cole), who, along with the B.L.F. & E. representative
in charge of the strike (E. F. Brehany), expressly
11
J!Jmncd the same by affixing their signatures thereto,
and forwardt>d it to the B.L.F. & E. General Secretary
and Treasurer (R. R. Bryant). (R. 918-919, 942-944,

946-948)

] !)

Glen R. Draper, Recording 8ecretary of Lodge
testified as follows with respect to the propriety of thf:
certification and approval procedures followed:

Q. Now, do you know of an:v l'l-'S]Jl'd in whi('/i
strike payroll Exhibit No. P-78 was handk·d and
administered that was not in strict eonforrnih
·with the provisions of Article 10 of the Consti.
tntion 1
THE WITNESS: As far as I ronl<l determine, it was processed as nearl)' as J>o:-;sible according to the rules laid dmvn for it in the Constitution. (R. 948)
Article 10 of the B.L.F. & E. Constitution n•qniw
that, when the steps specified for proper payroll c<'rtification and approval have been taken, as tlwy ·were i11
this case, the General Secretary and rL'reasmer ":)ll!lll
issue checks from the General Fund for tlw amonnt <ln1·
and persons whose names appear on the certified !Jay.
rolls." Plaintiffs, with the threl::' exceptions noted, appeared on that duly certified payroll, P-78. The defendants' president, H. E. Gilbert, improperly strnck
plaintiffs from P-78, as Article 10 Section 3 (h) of tl1P
Constitution makes issuance of strikP benefit
to
persons listed on a certified payroll 11rn 11rlu to»y and provides no authority to H. E. Gilbert or anyone else to
interfere with the prescribed proc<'ss for
of
strike benefits once- a strike payroll has been constitutionally certified. (Exhibit P-1, page 197)
Defendants' assertion that the initial payroll wa,
invalid because it contained the names of persons, inclwling the plaintiffs, not in the bargaining unit reprcsenkcl
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, tlie <l<>f!,ndants, is contrary to
evidt·nce as well
11
rn<·.onsistrnt with th<j B.L.F. &
Constitution. As
indi('.atl'd ahove, the record discloses that persons out,jdi· tlw H.L.F. & K hargaining unit wen· solicited for
ntPmlwrship and told
\Vould receiH strike benefits
(R. 120ti) and B.L.F. & E., in prior Kennecott strikes,
paid strike ht'nefits to persons who were not within its
bargaining nnit (R. 92G). Furthermore, Martin C. Jenfinaneial sPcretan· of tlH' defendant local and the
pPrson who prepared the initial strike payroll, testifif'd
that lw Pxpressly informf'd officers of the B.L.F. & E.
h: letter that hP had included all the new nwmhPrs on
foat payroll nndPr an assumed, and perhaps improper,
oernpational designation. Despite such notice, which was
ap1wndPd to the payroll itself, the authorized officials
of thl' B.L.F. & E. approved that payroll. (R. 920 and
Exhibit P-78)
9. The Evidence Supports the Finding that Defendants Did Not Inquire Regarding, Nor Disqualify, Anyone from Strike Benefits as a
Result of Outisde Earnings During the Period
of the Strike.

For a complete discussion of the record on these
math,'rs, :-;ep Point V below.
10. The Evidence Supports the Finding that the
Defendants and Their Officers Had a Fiduciary Duty to Plaintiffs.

1t is quite true as ddendants contend, that the Conof the B.L.F. &
creates a strict fiduciary
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duty between the defendant Grand Lodge and itti ine 111 _
bers with respect to the administration of all membercreated funds from which benefits, including strike benefits, are paid (Exhibit P-1, pp. 195-199). Those provisions require strike benefits to be paid, without discriinination, "to each member and non-member engaging in
a legal strike authorized by this organization." (Art. 10,
Sec. 3(a), Exhibit P-1, p. 195) As indicated above, thP
plaintiffs did engage in a strike at Kennecott which
authorized by the B.L.F. & E. (See Section 7) They
were thus entitled to receive said strike benefits, just the
same as all other members of Lodge 844 who were Pngaged in the same strike, and defendants' refusal to
pay plaintiffs such benefits, while paying them to the
other members of Lodge 844, constitutes a clear breach
of the strict fiduciary duty contained in the· B.L.F. &E.
Cons ti tu ti on.
11. The Evidence Supports the Finding that the
Defendants Knowingly Made False Promises of
Strike Benefits to the Plaintiffs.

Without any support whatever in thP record, <lefendants assert that the Grand Lodge officers of the
B.L.F. & E. had no knowledge that unconditional strike
benefit promises were being made until "well after tlw1
had been made and the strike had begun." As indicated
in Section 4 above, the record in this case clearly establishes that the B.L.F. & E. officers, and particular!:
the International President Gilbert, knew as early as
November 21, 1966 that such unconditional promises of
strike benefits were being made, and they contimwd h1
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lw so informed throughout the entire course of the organ-

izational campaign. (Exhibits P-41, 51, 54, 60, 70, 93,
109, D-144, 162, 163) Furthermore certain of those offieials thPmselves actively participated in certain aspects
ot the organizational campaign in Utah including the
cirenlabon of written strike benefit offers. (R. 11091110, 1136-1137)
The
endants' assertion becomes preposterous in
light of the nncontroverted evidence that E. F. Brehany,
International Vice-President, participated in the very
dl'hate in March, 1967 at which defendants have stipulated unconditional promises of strike benefits were
made. (R. 1061, 1198)
With respect to that portion of the trial court's
Firnling N um her Twenty that defendants knowingly
allowed unconditional strike benefit promises to be, made
to plaintiffs with no intention of fulfilling the same,
it is significant that the defendants allowed the plaintiffs from at least March 24, 1967 to the commencement
nf the strike on July 15, 1967 to believe that they would
n'reive such promised strike benefits. Having knowledge
for that fifteen-week period that such unconditional
promise of strike benefits had been made to plaintiffs,
dt'fendants at no time within that period informed plainti ffa that they would not be paid such benefits. (R. 1233Yet, during that period defendants accepted dues
from thP plaintiffs and required them to perform all
dutiPs of membership. (R. 1057, 1060-61, and Exhibit
P-77) The record is uncontroverted on this matter, and
:twh unconscionable conduct clearly supports the lower
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court's finding that the deft>ndants, in that res1wct,
in bad faith.
As shown above, each of the findings of fact upon
which the judgment below is based is amply sn1)}JOl'(pcJ
by the evidence, and therefore the judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed in all respects.
POINT II
THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN ITS
FINDING THAT VALID CONTRACTS HAD
BEEN ENTERED INTO BY PLAINTIFFS AND
DEFENDANTS. THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNlON AND PLAINTIFFS WAS NOT LIMITED TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE U N I 0 N CONSTITUTION.
FURTHER, THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN
ITS FINDING THAT THE CONTRACTS ENTERED INTO BY THE UNION'S REPRESENTATIVES WERE BINDING UPON THE UNION.
1. The Agreement Entered into by Plaintiffs and
the Defendants was not Prohibited by any Provision of the Union Constitution.

The trial court found, after consideration of
tive evidence presented by both parties, that:
[A] uthorized representatives of dt>f endanb l'P]lresented to plaintiffs that the,\- 'voul<l be paid
strike benefits rpgardless of tlie outcome of tlir
then forthcoming election.... at no tinw during
said campaign did defendants or an,\' of tli(•ir
said authorized representatives condition thr
rnent of said strike benPfits upon BLF&E
in said representation campaign or e!Petion or
upon any factor otlwr than plaintiffs' HH'll11JPrship .... (Findings of Fact, 6.)
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'l'lw eonrt further found:
Fla.intiffs, induct>d by and in reliance upon these
and other offers, representations and guaranties,
and particularly those regarding strike benefits,
ae<·eptPd said off em, joined as members of defendants and thereafter performed all obligations
and dutiPs required of members, including paywPnt of dnes, attendance at llllc'etings, and service
of ]Jicht
(Findings of Fact, 7.)
The dPtails of the repn•sentations made by def endnnts' reprPsentatives are set forth at pp. 7-13, supra.
ll is rrnffieient here to reiterate that defendants' repreH·ntatiws nnequivocally promised plaintiffs that, in the
evrnt of a strike, tlwy would be entitled to recein' strike
hPnrfits regardless of the election's outcome and that, in
reliance u1rnn those representations, plaintiffs rendered
to rlefe11dants all the duties of union membership, in<'lucling
of dues and performance of strike duty.
Dt•fendants have argued at pp. 16-21 of their Opening· Brief that because Article 10, Section 3(a) of the

H.L.F. & E. constitution provided that strike benefits
lit' paid to nwmbers and non-members engaged in a "legal
drih authorized by [the union]," that plaintiffs were
110t t'ntitlt>d to receive strike benefits.
Dt>f Pndants contend, without judicial support, that
thr term ''legal strike authorized by this organization"
a term of art as used in the context of labor-managenwnt n·lations (Def. Br. p. 16), the effect of which is to
''Xdude tlw plaintiffs from any class entitled to receive
lwnefits. Any promisP to pay benefits to a broader
C'lass, they contend, is contrary to the constitution.
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Defendants' contention is fatally defective on S\·i·
eral counts. First, it is clear from the terms of Artick
10, Section 3, that subsection 3(a) is not snfficient to
bar binding promises to pay strike benefits to mernbl'I"'
not within the bargaining unit. Article 10, 8t>ction 3(P)
states:
The provisions of this Section conct>rning thP
payment of strike benefits is
only anil
shall not be the basis of any legal liahilih' 011
this part of the Brotherhood.
·
Further, Section 3 (b) of Article 10 states:

It shall be the policy of the organization to in.

elude as eligible to receive strike lwnefits undtr
the provisions of this Section members and non.
membe·rs on lea,·e of absence or furloughed fro111
service ... who respond to the strike call in thl'
manner of assisting in manning of picket lines.
. . . ; [further,] the payment of strike hem·fit>
as prescribed in Paragraph (a) to es1wcially de.
serving employees or members who aid t/11
Brotherhood in a strike, may he authorized by tlw
International President with the concnrrenrl' of
the Finance Committe<-'. [Emphasis added.l
It is clear from the foregoing that: ( l) S<>ction
3(a), and any limitations on payment of strike
which it may imply, is directory only and dol>S not har
the union or an authorized represPntati\'(' thPrPof frnlli
promising or granting strike bem·fits to
not
enumerated in subsection (a); (2) Section 3(h) W
cifically authorizes and announces as a matter of union
policy the granting of strike benefits to mPmhPrn or
non-members who perfonn picket duty or who arP "esp1"
cially deserving" and aid the Brotherhood in a strike
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'l'Jw int<'nt of tJ1is subsection obviously is to authorize
paynwnt of strike benefits to persons who assist the
union in a strike who might not come within the coverage
ul F1cctio11 3(a).
J

E\·en if the promises - which the trial court found
ereated a binding contract - could b0 limited by the
krms of tlw nnion constitution, the terms of Article 10,
f'Pction :3 definitely did not preclude payment of strike
Jieiwfits to plaintiff8. Any contrary interpretation of
the constitution by the International President is clearly
incorrect.

2. Plaintiffs, as Union Members, were Entitled to
Strike Benefits Equal to Those of Other Members Similarly Situated.

Plaintiffs not only were eligible for strike benefits
nrnler the union constitution, tlH'Y were, as union memlH·r:-; and strikP participants, e·ntitled to benefits equal
to
of other striking memher8 of the Brotherhood
similarly situated. ThP obligation of a union to represent and art on behalf of all members of the same bargaining nnit in a fair and non-discriminatory manner
wt>ll-established. Conley u. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78
:-;.ct. 99. 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Williams v. Yellow Cab
Cn,
F.:2<l ::0:2
Cir.
cert. denied, 346 US.
:-:-io (1953); Cherico v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,
i(i7 F. Supp. G35 (8.D.N.Y. 1958). Further, it has been
1iPJ(1 that a union may not, in representation of workers
; 11 om· bargaining lm1on, so <lPport itself as to invade
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the rights of other workers not in the bargaining nnit.
Brother{wod of R.R. Trainmmz v. Howard, 343 l1.S.
774, 72 S.Ct. 1022, 96 L.Ed 1283 (1952).
'
3. Plaintiffs Would Be Entitled to the Strike Benefits Promised by the Union's Representatives
Even if Those Representations Were at Variance with the Union Constitution.

It is not necessary, however, to establish that plaintiffs were entitled, by virtue of their union membership
alone, to recovery of s.trike benefits or that such promises
were consistent with the union constitution. The
made to them by the union's field representatives constitute a contract between plaintiffs and defendant,.
(Conclusions of Law, § 4.) As has been pointed out at
pp., 2-3, supra, defendants' field rt>prentativPs stated
to the plaintiffs in clear and unequivocal language that
the promises made to them were consistent with tlw
union constitution. In fact, the representatives stated
that the benefits were guaranteed by the constitution.
( R. 396-397)
It is a general rule that a party, \d10 having pnpared the contract in question, makes an explicit (or,
in some cases, an implied) represPntation of the contract's contents under circumstances whPre it is reasonable to assume that the other party will
upon thosP
representations (especially when the other party is of
imited education or when the contract provisions tHI'
vague or difficult for the ordinary layman to comprchenr), he wil be bound by those representations P\Pll
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tJie:· an' at \'anance with the written instrument. A
arianc·(· bL·tween the representations of defendants'
1
iqire:-::tmtatives and the terms of the union constitution,
if ;:;iwh a ,·ariance exists, must be resolved so as to prest·n·e th<:> pro111iss<:>es' t>xpected benefits. If union member:o:hip creates a contractual relationship, as defendants
eontend it does (Br., p. 30), this general rule must apply.
lt "1rnld he lndicrous to expect men of plaintiffs' limited
l'ducation and expt>rience to have knowledge of the "terms
nf art/' (Br. p. Hi) intricacies of the Labor Management
l\Platiom; Act (Id., p. 17), and details of the proceedings
111' the 33rd through 39th International Conventions of
the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen
(Id., pp. 19-21) upon which defendants base their interpretation of the constitution. Indeed, defendants, in this
section, han' failed to cite a single sentence of the conwhich would put an ordinary man on notice of
Pn·n a potential variance between the organizers' promand the terms of the constitution.
il

ln .employers Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd. v .
.1/wfric, ;}-1: Dt>l. 1-l:G, 17-1: A.2d 809 (Del. Super. 1961),
'1111111wn; .i ud!JllU'nt ret·'d, 54 Del. 593, 183 A.2d 182
!
the court found that plaintiff was a "somewhat
1mtutorPd and unsophisticated man" who had stated his
i11o:urnnce net>ds to an agent if the Liability Assurance
Corporation and that the agent had represented the
poliey to Madric as providing the coverage he sought.
,\I adrir hast>d his decision to purchase that and no other
npon the agent's representation. 174 A.2d at 810\..1 l. Tlwrd'ore, the company was bound by its agent's
i':i l l'P f ll'E'SPntations.

The California Supreme Court, in Steven v. Fideliti
& Casualty Co. if N.Y., 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 377
58 iCal. 2d 362 N.Y. (1962) ( accord, Lachs v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co. of N. Y., 30G N. Y. 357, 118 N.K2d 550
(1954); Fidelity & Casualty Co. uf N. Y. r. Smith, rn!J
F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1951)), found d<>fendant insuranei:
company liable for coverage on a decedent who died in
the crash of an unscheduled "air taxi" even though the
policy set out across the top: NOT FOR TRA YEL OX
OTHER THAN SCHEDULED AIR
D1·cedent has substituted the charter service for a rt-gular
carrier when his scheduled flight was cancelled. The
court found that it was not certain that decedent could
have made out the qualification before purchasing the
policy from the vending machine. More important, it
found that an ordinary traveler could not be expected to
know the technical difference between sclwdnled and nonscheduled carriers and that the insurer should have foreseen the probability of an occasional passegrn·r sub8tituting non-scheduled transportation. It was held that the
customer had ''bargained for protection for the whole,
not part of, the trip." 377 P.2d at 17G.
The insurance contract had included a definition of
"scheduled carrier" 'in the policy. Howt•ver, tht> conrt
observed that this definition was only one clause in a
2,000-word contract and held that this definition wa'
no binding because the clause was "inconspicuous" anil
"unclear." 27 Cal. Rptr. at 181-82.
The court concluded:
If [defendant] deals with tlw publie on a ma.';
basis, the notice of non-coverage of the polic> 111
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a situation in which the pnhlic may reasonably
Pxpeet covPrage must be conspicuous, plain and
dc•ar." 27 Cal. Rptr. at 182.
'l'lw N t>W .Jersey Supreme Court, m Henningsen v.
Bioomfi<lrl Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)
drew support from the principles of the airline insurance
('<lSPS in voiding a manufacturer's disclaimer of warranty
and holding that a buyer possesses an implied warranty
of reasonable fitness if he makes known to the seller the
particular purpose for which the article is required and
it appears that he has relied upon the seller's skill and
jndgnwnt. 161 A.2d at 76, 93-94.
In Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Co. v. Farm Air
8cr?'Ce, l11c., 255 F.2d G58 (5th Cir. 1958), the court held

tl1at an ambiguous exclusion of fire coverage from an
insnrance contract was void against insured where it
was clear from the parties' negotiations that plaintiff
liad dPsired and thonght that he had purchased a contrnet wliieh included fire coverage.
In the instant cast>, plaintiffs were told through
dt>f Pndant's handbills that strike benefits were guaranteed
tlwrn. They were told later that the benefits were guarmitt>Pd by tlw union constitution. The constitution, to
\Yhirh most did not han• access until a later date, is 305
nagps long. The section regarding strike benefits is
fairl>· ('omplicatPd and well over 1,000 words in length.
Tt is n•asonahle to expect that a man of limited education, e\'Pn if he read the pertinent provisions, would have
1H• mkling of a potential disparity between the union's
1·1·presentations and the constitution's contents.
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Plaintiffs' comprehension of their bargain with tJip
union undoubtedly was determined by what they read
in union campaign leaflets and what they were told by
union personnel. These plaintiffs are entitled to thP
same rights against the promisor union that other plaintiffs have been accorded against commercial
Indeed, the reliance and expectations of both
of plaintiffs is nearly identical.
4. Plaintiffs' Rights Arisng from the Promises of
Union Representatives Cannot be Negatived by
a Disclaimer of Legal Liability in the Union
Constitution.

Defendants' representatives characterized th Pi r
promises as "guarantees." In common speech, the word
''guarantee'' indicates a binding promise and when it is
used in that sense, the courts will interpret it as expressing "an intention to warrant, insure, covenant, pledge
or promise to be bound to perform.'' Northern Imp. Co.
v. Pembina Broadcasting Co., 157 N.\¥.2d 97, 103 (N.D.
1967). Accord, Conkling v. Standard Oil Co., 116 N.W.
822, 824, 138 Iowa 596 (1906). Such terminology is completely inconsistent with any attempt to negah> those
promises through an excldpatory clanse.
Exculpatory clauses are to he constnwd stridl)
against the party drafting the coutrnct. This rule ha)
special force in those cases in which the contract was one
of adhesion rather than negotiation. This rule is well
Pstablished in Utah. In Seal i:. Tayco, Inc., 16 lTtah
323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965), where seller had failed to deliYer the quantity of goods required by agreement, seller\
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-r. 1111 tract eontaiued a provision excusing him from liabil-

ity for any delays or defaults by reason of fire, floods,
acts of Go<l, labor troubles, inability to secure raw matenals, acts of government, or other causes beyond reasonnhle control. The second sentence thereafter added:
"ln no eyent shall seller be liablt> for special or
con:,a·qnential damages."
'!'lie Supreuw Conrt found the disclaimer of liability for

,pecial or consequential damages susceptible to two intl·qiretatiom;: that it gave selll'r blanket protection
ap;ainst an;· claim of special or consequential damages
or that it prokcti•d him only against damages resulting
from dela.'· caused by fin', flood, acts of God, etc. In
adopting tht>
limited interpretation, the Court
[I]t
manifest!:· unfair to iwnnit 01w who
fonnulatt>s a contract to so fashion it as to mislead
the other party by setting forth a clearly apparent
prornisP or l'PJffPsentation in order to induce ac<·epta1H'P, and tlwn de>signedly "burying" elsewhere
in tht> docnllH'nt, in fim• print, provisions which
pmport to limit or take awa;· the promise>, and/or
pn·el u<lP rPeover;· for failure to fulfill it. Hi Utah
at :)'.2(i.
'L'lie N l'\\' York Co mt of Appeals held in the Lachs
Slljmt, 1 rn
2d at 559 that
th<• hmd<'n ... is on the defendant [insurer] to

Pstablish that tlw words and Pxpressions not
on!.\· an• snsct>ptible of the construction sought
.. but that it is the only construction which may
f11ir111 /J(' placed 011 them. (Emphasis added.)
rl1l1e uffrd of the allegPd exculpatory language in del'r·nd:u1t's ('Onstitution is no different than that in the
r·rintruet,_ in thP above cases.
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5. The Defense of Ultra Vires is Not Available
to the Defendants.

The trial court, having found as a matter of fael
that a particular representation constituted the ba8i 8 of
plaintiffs' reliance, that finding should be allowed to
stand. The defense of ultra vires is not available to a non.
profit corporation under Utah law. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 16-6-23 states:
Defense of ultra vires - No act of a non-profit
corporation and no comTeyance or transfer of rPal
or personal property to or by such corporation
shall be invalid by reason of the fact that tlw corporation was without capacity or power to do
such act or to make or receive such conYFyancc
or transfer .... [The statute states several exceptions to the rule, none of which are applicable
to the present case.]
Although Utah has no separate statute governmg
unincorporated associations, the 'ultra vires defense is a
creature of corporation law. The Business and NonProfit Corporation Acts set forth an unambiguous policy
that corporations should not be permitted this dPfeme
against plaintiffs suing on contracts with them. There is
no sound policy dictating a different rule in the case of
unincorporated associations. Indeed, a trade union, rwn
though unincorporated, "is for many purposes gin•n tl1L'
rights and subjected to the obligations of a legal entit>·.''
International Ass'n of 1Vlachinists v. Gon.zales, 35G
617, 619, 78 S. Ct. 923 (1958).
The only cases cited by defendants which deal sprcifically with the availability of the 'ultra vires
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trade union are Amalgamated Clothing Workers v.
Kiser, 174 Ya. 229, G S.E. 2d 562 (1939), and United
IJllll. uf Carpenters and Joinders v. Moore, 206 Va. 6, 141
s.K 2d 729 (1965). Neither decision could have been
consistently with U'l1AH CODE ANN. § 16-6-23.
the theory of union government which underlies
hoth decisiom; is at variance with better-reasoned decitn a

rn 1e Kiser decision, which the Moore court consideri'd dispositive of Virginia law on the subject, was render·d by diYided court. The dissent regarded the majority
opinion as gravely unrealistic and ignoring the "close
analogy . . . between the constitution of a voluntary
association, like the defendant, and the charter of an
ordinary business corporation." 6 S.E. 2d at 567.
The more up-to-date rule governing trade unions
was set forth in MoonPy v. Bartenders Union Local No.
::38, 48 Cal. 2d 841, 313 P.2d 857 (1957):
The court will . . . act in a proper case for the
purpose of protecting the property rights of a
mern her of unincorporated association and will,
enfoce, so far as practical, the rulPs apply to
incorporatf•d bodies of the same character. 313
358 .
.Justice 'l'obriner, writing for a unanimous California
Court in Daniels v. Sanitarium Association, Inc.,
:iri Cal. 2d 602, 30 Cal. Rptr. 828, 381 P.2d (1961) dismis8ed the theory that trade unions should be treated as
lllPre 8ocial groups as "obscurantism" "fraught with
latPnt unfairnt>ss and patent difficulties." 30 Cal. Rptr. at
"31. '·rrl1e old approach," he wrote, regarded all members
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of tlw union as principals and agents or partners ....
After analyzing the emerging entity status of a labrir
union, we [have] concluded that the old rule could nu
longer be applied to unions. Id at 830-831. Tlw opinion
went on to reiterate, with obvious approval, tlil• 11oldina
of Justice Dooling in Marshall v. lnternatio1i.a1l Long-'
shoremen' s and TV a re housemen's Union. 57 Cal. 2cl I'll,
22 Cal. Rptr. 211 371 P.2d 978 (1966):
It is obvions that [labor unions] are no lonopr
b
comparable to volnntan- fraternal ordPrs (}J'
partnerships; that the)·
sui ge•nesis, and ap
proxirnat(• corporations in their 01wrations allll
powpn; ... To comsidPr such organization::; n11cl1·1
prPsent day conditions as nwre social or frat\'mal
orders or partnerships is to close one's eyes to
the rPalities now existing. 57 Cal.
at
22 Cal. Rptr. at 215, 371 P.2d at 91.
Justice Dooling added that wlwn partnt>rship eoncepts are transf errt>d to
•
labor unions, which normally act through
officers and in which individual mernhns kn
little or no anthorit)· in da)·-to-da)· operations of
the association's affairs, reality is apt to lw ,.;anifieed for literary formalism. The eomts. in r1Tognition of this fact, have from case to casP gradual!)- t>volvPd new tht>ories approaching tlw proLh·ms of sneh associations, and tlwrt> is no11· an·speetable body of judicial decisions, espPeialh 111
the labor union field . . . . ·which recop:nized tl1 1
existPnCf' of nnincorporatt>d and associations nnrl
labor unions as separatt> entities for a yari1•t1 pf
pnrpos<>s. 57 Cal. 2d at 7H3-7S4,
Cal. Rptr. ul
213, 371 P.2d at 989. Accord, Oi.l lVorkl'rs I 11/1'1; 111
tionol Union 'C. Sitpr'rior Court, 10;3 Cal. App.
512, 2:30 P.2d 71 (1951 ), !uglis v. Opcratin(t F11n 1
11!'ers Local No. 12, 58 Cal. 2d 2G!J,
Cal.
403, 373 p .2d 467 ( 1962).
1

36

ln 7· 111ted Stntrs r. H1 1tite,

U±S,

L. Ed. 1542 (1944), tlw

1;.s. G9±, G± S. Ct.
Statt>s Supreme

Court ohsen·ed:
Strndmally and fnnctionall:·, a labor union is an
institution whid1 im·olw:-; more than the> private
and per:-;onal intere:-;ts of it:-; uwmlwn;. . . . The
nnion's Pxist<>nc<· in fact, and for some purposes
in lmr, i:-; l!S perpetual as taht of any coqwration.

Tn a n·cent decision, dismissing the claims against
tlw nffiel'rs of a trade union, the Court, in Aktinsun r.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 F.S. 238, 82 S. Ct. 1318, 8 L. Ed. 2d
3:11 (1%:.!), s1weificall:· applied the corporate analogy
to a labor union. The Con rt held that SPction 301 (b)
of thP Labor-Management Act of 19-1:7, ''evidences a Congressional intent that a union as an entirety, like a corporation, Jw tlw s ole source of recovery for injnn· inflich•d
it." 8till rnore n·cently, the Court obsened: "LT]he
labor movPnwnt has grown up and must assmnP ordinary
respon:-;ihilitie:-;." J,i11n r. I'la11t Ouard Wkrs. of America.
l.ocul Xo. 114, :iG3
56, G3, SG S. Ct. 657 (1966).
D(•ff:>nda11t:-;' position that a trade union should be
i11m11nw to liabilit:" for allegedly ultra i·ires acts of its
agents is outdat(•d and wholl:· unjustifiable. It has no
in
Ftah law and defendants are unable
to
a :-;ingl<' practical or eqnitable rPason why tlH·
1
1 rineiplP should lw adopt\:'d in this jurisdiction.
Neither
thp NUJH'Pllle Court of the enitPd States nor the Supreme
C'1Jurt of California have found that such claims the least
11 1eritorious, in viPw of modern conditions. In fact, the

court dPfrndants cite as upholding their proposition
ilid c;o liy onl)· a narrow margin.
"

11

P
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POINT III
'PHE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN ITS
FINDING THAT PLAINTIFFS CONTRACT
CLAIMS COULD PROPERLY BE ADJUDICATEm BY A COURT OF LAW.
1. A Trade Union is Accorded No "Special Treat-

ment" Insofar as its Contractual Obligations to
its Members are Concerned.

29 U.S.C. § 411 states:
No labor organization shall limit the right of am
member thereof to institute an action in any com:t
. . . irrespective of whether or not th(; lallllr
organization or its officers are named as defodants or respondents in such action or proePeding
1'he plain import of the above statnte is to JffPrlnde
"special treatment" of a labor nnion when ih; rnernlw1»
seek adjudication of their legal rights.
Since the enactment of Section 411, the
eon
sistently have held that a nnion nwrnber ma:-.- sePk
covery in tlw courts for violation of those right:' whieli
deYolve upon him by operation of law. Those
in
eluded his rights under the Labor-Management
Act. Nelson u. Jolvnson, 212 F. Snpp. 233 (D.
aff'd., 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963). The Unikd fltate.'
Suprem(' Court has held, even prior to the enatruwn
of Section 411, that a union member has recourse to tlw
courts for a breach of contract between him and the union
It held that a nnion which wrongfnll,\- expelled a mPmhei
was guilty of breach of contract and was suhj<>ct to thal
ml•mbPr's recourse to the state
of California. Gn111
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II..' ,. International Assn. of Machinists, 1±2 Cal. App.
207. 298 P.2d 92, 99 (195G), aff'd., 35G U.S. 617, 78 S.
l't. %, 2 L.Ed. 2d 1098 ( 1958). Accord, Lockridge v.
·ii

t

•

JJ1rn1r;anwted Assn. of Street, Electrical, Bailway and
.l/otor Coach Employees of America, 369 P.2d 1006

(I<lal10 19G2).
'L'he cases cited hy appellants in support of their
r·initPntion that unions are Pntitled to ''special treatment"
all involved questions of internal union policy, rather than
contracts between the union and a member thereof. In
Cnited Glass Workers, Local No. 188 r. Seitz, 399 P.2d
it ("\V as11. 1905), the court refused to enforce a fine
\('ried by the union upon a defendant for violation of the
union eonstitution. In that cmw, the court held that
"\rhere the parties to a contract foresee a condition wl1ich
ma:· dewlop and provided in their contract a remedy for
the hawening of that condition, the presmnption is that
thP parti«s inh'nded tht> prescri.hed remedy as the sole
rt>medy ... and this ]ffesmuption is controlling where
therP is nothing- in the contract ibelf or in the circum'bl.11c:e1-: snrronnding its execution that ne-cessitatt-s a
diffnf'nt <·onclusion.'' Tht> \Yashington Supreme Court
f( garded thP diseiplinary provisions of the union condition,; as tltP "qlliYalent of arbitration clanses. It is not
iwcessary to rlwPll npon tlw differences hetwet>n a penalty
prescrilwd by a nnion constitution for a specific act and
an
m1fores1•pn eam:p of action arising out of a
SPparatp contract ert>ated between a union and a prospectiw lllPH1h<>1-. The other cases cited by appellants in
:,Hpport of tlwir proposition that the "right of a labor
111
·i.;anization as a voluntary association to administer
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its rnles is . . . sacred" all pre-date tlw ('Jlad111<>nt 1,:
Section -111 of the LMRA and all im·olved
rrt
purely intPrnaJ union policy. Clearclmul Urcl1csfro (' 0111
mitter 1,·. Cleaveland Fed. of illnsicirN1s, et al., :m:i P.2d
229 (6th Cir. 1962) and Dyer r. Occidental Life Jn,.
Co., 182 F.2d 127 UHh Cir. 1950) both inrnh·<' cliallPng-P,
to the validity of the anwndinents of union ntl<'s. Plott
L'. Amalgamated Assn. of Street a11d f,'l('(:frical
Employees of America, 30 rtah 472, 167 Pac. s:m (J!llil,
Louisville and N. Ry. Co. r. Jlf i.fler, 219 Ind. :38D, \.t
2d 239 (1941), cert denied, 317
(i44 (19±1 ), H11r111irut
i:. UAvV, 12 N.J. Super. 79 A.2cl SS (l!l5l), alldJiurt111
1 1• Favcll, 344 Mich. 215, 73 K.\Y. 2cl S3(i (1!J55) all involved appeals from imposition of union disC"iplirn•.
The law recognizes a distinction lwt\\'e<'ll a uninn
member's rights clt•rivecl solPly from his union HH·111l11·rship and his rights arising hy operation law. Although Jefenclants contend that tltl' plaintiffs in this eas<> ''allt·ge
that they have a contractual right to l'<'C'('i \'<' strike· benP
fits pursuant to th<:> constitution of thP union," plaintiffactnally alh--'g!::' that their right to n•eein· strikl' lw1lt'!1tis derived from the constitution and/or
rnadr
to them b:· a nnion organizl•r. lnsofar as a <·011trac1
l'Xists - hy means of the constit11tion or oth<>nriH· that contract may he intPrprded by thP <'ourts.
2. The Trial Court Could Not Be Precluded by
Any Provision in the BLF&E Constitution from
Taking Jurisdiction over this Action and Granting the Recovery Sought by Plaintiffs.
This action doPs not llll'n•l.'· involv<' till' intern:r
affairs of a union. It is, of cotirHP, an adion l'or lirvni:,
of contract involving a sPrious clPprivation h.'· df'fl'lldant

1

40

t piamtiff:-:' pec·uniary rights.

It

well e::;tablished
., ,_t.,te
l'Ourt lllay• and :should intl,l'Vl'lle in union
t Ij(l t ....
« .
involving property of peeuniary rights of memIn this n•spect, it n·1wat<·dly ha:s lwen held that
tlw dt'privation of p<•euniar:-• lwm•fib resulting from
,IJ rndiiwti ('ontrndual oldigation:-; involvPs a <1nestion of
due proe<·:->:-> of law for \Yhieh judieial aid may properly
iil'
• \lll .•Ju r. :2d
:2S and the ca::; es cited therein. ,\Lor" parti('t1larl>··
a:-; in tlH· in::;tant ease, the
(·ontrowr:-;:· <'OJl('l'l'llS 11101w:· arnl pro1wrty rights, as
di:-ting11i:-:lwd from 111atters of a:ssoeiation dis<'iplim·,
JIO!iey or doetrirn', th<· llll'llllwrs' right to rPsort to tlu..•
court cannot lw ahridgPd h: JJ!'O\·isions of thP organ1zatinn':-: <·on:-;titlltion. U'/Jrie11 I'. Jlatwtl, 1-l 111. App. :2<l,
li3 1-t-t X.E. :2d -1--1-fi ( 19:->I ) .
11

1:-;

.\. dedaration in tlw eonstitution of an unineorporatPd a:-;:-:o('iation, lik<· that of .Art. 10, Sec. :3( e) of the
B.LP.l\:K ('011stitution, (Exhibit J>-1), that its obligato it:-: 1twrnlwrs an· not <·ontradual but moral only,
and that thl·: do not eonstitutl· obligations Pnforeeahle
'11 (':':ii adion, <·a11110t l'han1r(• th<• r<·al eharacter of such
11i1ligatio11.-;. Hof1i11s1111 '" 'i'1·111jJlar f,od!Jc', 1.0.0.F., 117
('al. ::/ti, -!!I Pa<'. 110 ( 1
'

Pro\ i:-:ioJ1:-; of a llnion eonstitution rnust be strictly
so as to pn•spn·p tl1P rights of mernlwrs to
d111· ]1!<1<1·:-:s of la\\. i11 tit<' <'ourts. In Armstro11g I'. Duffy,
( ( Jliio 1!1:-J I\. thP eourt was eonfronh'd
11
ith ll11ion rnnstitutional prnvisio11s sirnilar to thosP
inY 11 k1·d li:· dPfl·rnlants in th<' instant east>. Rejecting
1111 · 11111011':-; att<·111pt to usp its constitntional in·ovisions
' 11 di·pi;n, tit(• rnllrt of jllrisdidion, th<· eourt in Ann-
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iitrong held such prov1810ns cannot be t'nforced \\liti·
they impinge upon a union member's right to due proce,,,
of law under federal or state constitutions. After citill•
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United State1:; Con 8ti"
tution and a provision of the Ohio Constitution identical
to that of Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution 11 f
Utah, the court held that the plaintiffs had the right,
·unrestricted by any constitutional provision ·of the imwn,
to resort to the courts in the first instance for relief,
Two further deci8iom; to the effect that a court ma 1
disregard union constitutional provisions that ronflil't
"·ith duties imposed upon the union by law, inelude R91111
v. I.B.E.W., 361 F.2d 942 cert. denied, 383
(1967) (7th C ir. 1906), and Bates r. Brotherlwnd or
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 56
22il
(D.C. Fla. 1964). In Ryan, thP court held that a nnion
eonstitutional provision, as construed by the union, was
inconsistent with the provision of tlw LMRDA, 29
411 and was t lrns of no force and effr·ct. In so hold
ing, the court stated:
This claim of t'1P Union, it s<:>c•ms to ns,
0
m<'mher's bringing of a snit against a union 01 it'
offieers too ehancv
. a o·amhle for the lllP!lliJPI
and eff f•etnall \' blocks access to the courts ll\
placing thf' rne.rnber in tlw dilemma of
the
ahout which lw ,,·ishes to sw· (<1J1 11
against which the court might grant i1111rn·diRt•
and m•cessar,\· rPlief), Or sning U]JOn tJw l'jW<'lli<l
tion that lw will hf' safe from ('xpnlsion by !Iii
court's discretion ht>ing <'x<•reisf'd in his favor.
CongrPss eannot ha \'P infrndPd to bnrd 1•11
the profrction it gav<' union nwrnlwrs in tlw1r
right to sne in the 'Bill of Rights' of tlw
with the haz;ard that is clt•ar in defrndants' rlnn:
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TJw right of fr<•e access to our courts is too
prP.eions a
to bP
by the
prediction that the .Judge's discretion may, like a lucky
r(lll of <licP, turn up in fa\'Or of the suitor.
Tht' Boll's ease \ms an action against the BLF&E,
tlw Jefendant in th<· instant ca:--e. In Bates, tlw court held
that w'ither tJie union's constitntio11al provision involved
nor a <lPcision of th<· International President interpreting
tlw sanit' \ms hiding upon the court. Those matters, bein,\r in conflict with provisions of federal labor law, were
Jwld to be of no legal effect.

:.:. Provisions in the BLF&E Constitution that
would Foreclose Plaintiffs from a Remedy Outside of the Union are Without Force Under
Utah Law.
Ev"n asidt• frorn thP :--nbstantial problems of due
JH'OCt•ss g"<'nPrntP<l Ji:· tlw exculpatory provision of the
DLF&E Constitution, plaintiffs, under rtah law, may not
111• 11ouml to adjudieat<, their rights :--olely within the
llnion stnwtun'. Altliongh <l<'f Pmlant:-- contend that
plaintiffs' a\'qtti1·s(·PnC<' to sneh union constitutional proohligah•s tlH·rn to so confine thPir dispute, snch an
agTPPll1Pnt i:-- withont forcP in rtah. A contract of this
natim._ is iclt>ntical to an agn•enwnt to arbitrate future
a typ<> of agTePnH·nt consistently held illegal
m
state as eontrary to the state constitution and
lo ll\lhlic polit·y. Barnhart r. Ciril Scrrice Employres
lu.', Cn., Hi U.2d 223, 398 P.2d (1965). The arbitration
agn='Pll1Pnt ehallengPd in the Barnhart case was some'<1 liat !Ps:-; sm>t•ping than the contractual obligation which
,], f1·11dants would have the court impose upon plaintiffs
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m the case at bar. A unanimous Utah Supreme Conn
found that such a clause violated the terms of Utah Corir
Ann. 78-31-1 and ·was contrary to the governing case la\,
of the state. The court went further, holding that sutJ
a clause. was contrary to Article I, Section 11 of the l1taii
Constitution which provides:

1

All courts shall be open, and every iwrson for ,
injury done to him in his person, proprety 01
reputation shall have remedy by due course of la\r.
. . . and no person shall be barred from prosr
cnting or def ending before any tribunal in tlti,
state, by himself or counsel, any civil
tr
which he is a party.

111

The majority held:
It is thus to be seen that covenants which prm1r
a party from having access to court nms counter
to both the expressed purpose and the spirit 111
our system of justice. This is further aecenteJ
because snch a ]>rovision purports to confer fina!
judicial authority on private arbitrators anti
tends to divest the official courts of jurisdictiu11
This preclndes them from fulfilling their responti
bility of remaining available to adjudicate all:
controversies to
seeking justice ....

The instant case provides a circumstance of just th
sort of danger the Utah Supreme Court perceived in
arbitration proceeding immune to judicial review. Tl
plaintiffs' grievance in this case could not have bei·r,
satisfied except at a considerable financial cost to tl1
international union. Y t•t the defrndants hPre woulO lia''
the court believe that the only review permitted by the 11
constitution was review by a union officer with an ollit
ons interest in protecting the organization's funds.

1

11

1
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POINT IV
APPELLEES WERE NOT REQUIRED TO UTILIZE lNTERNAL UNION REMEDIES TO ANY
GREATER EXTENT THAN THEY HAD ALREADY DONE PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THIS
ACTION.
:Z9 F.8.C.

411(4) states:

No labor organization shall limit the right of any
nwmh<='r thereof to institute an action in any
court. ... Provided, that any such member may
he required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to e.rcerd n foitr-month lapse of
ti111r) ·witl1in such organization before instituting
lt>gal or administrative proceedings against such
organizations . . . . (Emphasis added.)
ri111e only ''internal remedy" which defendants claim

plaintiffs failed to "exhaust" was appeal to the general
conrention of the BLF&E. Hmyever, appeal to the union
gPneral conn'ntion could not have been taken for almost
a rear after th(-' dispute arose. (p. 3, supra, R. 785) Therel'on•, plaintiffs were excused by 8ection 411 from purming- snl'.h a remedy. Further, plaintiffs already have
1·xLmrnt<-'d the Brotherhood's internal appellate remedies.
Artide
tion statt>s:

Section 9(a) of the Brotherhood constitu-

::\ o mt>mher of or subordinate lodge of the BrotherJ1ood shall resort to the civi.l courts to correct or
rP<lrt>ss any allPged grievance or wrong, or to se1·un• any alleged right from or against any memh<'r, s11hordinatP lodge or the organization, until
sneh lllPrntwr or lodge shall first have exhausted
all n•rn<>dy h.'' appeal. .
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Article 16, Section 1, states:
(b) Should any doubt arise as to th(• rn·o111 .1
construction of any section or rule there>of, it sliad
be ref erred to the International President, wh 0,1,
decision shall be final, unless modified or rever 801\
by the ensuing convention.
( c) All interpretations rendered by the Inter.
national President on the Articles in the constit 11
tion, shall, unless rejected by the following connn
tion, be incorporated into the constitution when
codified.
Article 13, Section 6 ( c) designates the Internationi.i
President's decision on questions of union lmv (distinti
from other questions) as "final."
It should further be noted that the sections of tl11
constitution prescribing the activities and procedures of
the international convention (Art. I, Sections 10-401
make no provision for presentation of appeals from presi
dential decisions. There is no indication that plaintiff.would be entitled to appear in person or through coumi!
before the convention or any committee thereof. The onh
period during which the com·ention could consider plai11
tiffs' case would be during the time allocated to resolir
tions and motions. Yet Art. I, Sec. 29 of the constitution
restricts the period for such consideration to the first da:
of proceedings and "one (1) hour at each succeedinz
morning session thereafter." An extremely abhreviatl'li
debate before a convention of several hundred union rne111
hers does not amount to a genuine vehicle for appellat1
review.

Finally, the convention is a legislative, not judicial,
body. Article 1, Section 15 (a) of the constitution stater
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The Grand Lodge, in convention assembled, shall
have exclusive jurisdictional and supreme lawmaking power over all provisions of the constitution and matters that concern the Brotherhood....

words strongly suggest that the convention is a
Jpg·isJative body in which plaintiffs would have recourse
only to political rather than judicial or appellate remedies.
Defendants have further contended that plaintiffs
must plead exhaustion of remedies in their complaint.
However, none of the cases cited by them contain such
a proposition. Dalton v. Plitmbers and Steam Fitters,
Local No. 60, 122 So. 2d 88, 89 (La. 1960) states merely
tJiat plaintiffs must make such an allegation. There is
no question that such an allegation was made in the
eonr:o;e of this action. None of the other casE"s cited by appellants contain even that rule. Indeed, the federal courts
gen<'rally have treated the exhaustion of remedies doctrine as an affirmative defense: E.g., Fruit & Vegetable
I'ackers and Warehousemen, Local 760 v Morley, 378
F'.2rl 738 (9th Cir. 1967).
POINT V
DEFENDANTS HA VE WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO
LIMIT STRIKE BENEFITS BY REASON OF
EARNINGS OF THE PLAINTIFFS FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES, AND DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SUCH A LIMITATION.

Defendants contend that, under Article 10, Section
:\(i) of the B.L.F. & E. Constitution, strike benefits to
:Jii, plaintiffs should be limited to thosei months in which
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thl• striking plaintiffs Parnt>d less than $1 :>0.00 frl) 111 'ii:
sidt> SOlUCt>S. rl'his elaimed sl't-off has nPv<·r ht>Pn a11 1·:-..']
..
1

in this ca:'W. Tlw dPft>ndants wholl>· fail<>d to p!t·ad at,
such set-off and failed to n•sPrve sarnP as an
1,,
ht> tri<:>d, and, upon trial, offrn·d no PvidPlH'<· \\'hat 11.11
to support this contention.
Plaintiffs plPaded, triPd and arglwd this easl• to tli•
trial court on tlw t lwory that thP <:on tract lwtWl'l'n pia 111
tiffs and defrndants is eYidPnced by th<> oral and wm
teen offers for membPrship in d<>frndants 111adt· h:i iJ,
fondants during tlw organiz.ing dfort and acePpt1·1l I·
plaintiffs Upon joining defendants r['Jip n•c•ord is !Jarn1
of any evidence that such oral and written off Pr8 in
eluded any limitation upon the earnings of plaintiit·
in connection with the "h'lrnrantP<>s'' of strih lH'nPfit·.
IndPed, the overwh<>lming Pvidt•nc<• is to tlw <'nntran.
r['ht•J'e is l'Vidence that SOlll<' Of t}ll' plaintiffs\\'(']'(' UU\'ifP1!
and assun·d by reprt•s<>ntatives of dPfrndants,
.Mr. L. L. Iman, who \Vas in charge of the c-arnpaign, nn1.
)ilr. Brehany, the International \'icP-PresidPnt, that tl1 1
l·nion had ne\·er invokPd tlw $1i50.00 limitation on »ar::
ings and would not do so. (H. S/8-SSO) Plaintiff Fn'
( )n('ida tPstifit>d that the possibility of dt>frndant/ u
voking tlw Parings limitation was an issw· rai:-:Pd 11
thP organiz.ing cont<>st
tlw l'nit<'d
and eamwd dPf Pndants' offic•<•rs to obtain from a
nnmher a long-timP memlwrs of dl·f<·rnlants af'l'ida11:·
11
rf',citinp; that such lllPlllh<-'rs had 1•anwd in
:
$150.00 during prior strikes, but that strik<• benefits had
nt>Yer hef'n dPnied them. Thes<• affidavits \1·<·n· tlll'n
1
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:i'

• •
11 1 111

iirng toob to in<lrn·1· plaintiffs to join ch•fon<lants,

\K

Tlw dPft>ndants m their hrid, at pag1· -H,
tlw 1.0 11rt to
a portion of Article 10,
3(i)
11 1 1Jw H.L.F. & 1..:. Co11stitution, and eit<'<l that portion
1111 t 11 1' ('ontext. 1{1->a<l in its L•ntirl'ty, that <·onstitutional
n·quin·d that dd'Pndants pay to their striking
;iwllllwrs
bendits for a iwrio<l of at lt>ast thirty
(:lll) da.n;, and tliat thPrPaft1->r "all officers and rnPmbers
,1f tli1· organization'' t>xt1•1Hl
possible assistance to
1in1l
for 111e111lwrs on strikP ." (Exhibit P-1,
pp. I !J/-1 !I'-\)

It is, of eours1•, 1mcontrov1->rted that plaintiffs \\·Pre

st rik1· lw11Pfit for thP first
(:)0)
of t!iP strik1· or l'or <rn)· oth1•r part of the strik<•. Tlwre is
no 1·\ id1·n<·1· that tl11·rpaftt•r
officers or
llli"llll1l'l's of d<'fi.ndants pnl\·idPd
assistance to plainin obtaining 1·111plo)·11wnt. Thus, <lPfendants wholly
:':1il1·d to 1wrforn1 tlw 1·onditions pr<'<·edt•nt to their right
t 1 im 11kt- th $1.-iO.Oll 011bid1· l•arninµ:s li111itation as set
fnrtli 111 tlH· B.L. l•'. & E. ( 'onstitution.
J111t

paid

1

it' dl'!'P1Hlants had pf>rfornwd tl10se rondtions
1
1 n•(·1·dP11t, so as to lw PntitlPd to the supposPd lwndits
tlit>l'Poi". and PVl'n it' then· \\'PI'P l'YidPnrP to support dt>li·ndants' ('lailll of sl't-off, dPfrndants lun-P waivPd and
ari• 1·,;topp1·d m1d<·r tlH· eire1m1stanrPs to assert snrh a
'ia1m. Tl1P PYidPll<'l' is 111H·ontrovPrted that defendants
11 "1dl' no attPrnpt <luring thP subjt>et KPmwcott strikP to
1"1 1·n11i1H· \\']11'1 hPr an)' of its mPmlwrs (old or new, plain-

tiffs or not) had any monthly earnings in exces''IJ[
$150.00 per month during the time strjke benefits .h
paid or payable. (R. 878, 898, 929, and 934-935) DefrnrJ
ants admittedly did not disqualify a single member fro 111
strike benefits during the 1967-68 nation-wide coppei
strike by reason of outside earnings during the cour 8e01
the strike.
That no striking B.L.F. & E. members at Kennecott
were disqualified by reason of outside earnings is estati
lished plainly by the testimony of Martin Jensen, 01
fendan ts' Financial Secretary ( R. 934-935), and inter
rogatory answers of the defendants on this matter (R
158 and 215). There is also evidence in the record tha!
various persons who received strike benefits from d1
fendants earned in excess of $150.00 per month durinu
the periods when they received such benefits. (R. SS111
Defendants instructed their general organizers, who ir
turn advised plaintiffs, to disregard any constitutiona
provision regarding outside earnings during a strikr
because that provision had never been invoked and woulrl
not be invoked as a limitation upon the right of plain
tjffs to receive strike benefits. (R. 878-880, 1002-1004
E. F. Brehany; International Yice-President, was hirn
self present on one occasion during the organizational
campaign when one of the plaintiffs expressly inform111
those assembled that he had another job which woul i
provide him earnings exceeding $150.00 per month dur
ing any strike, and was nevertheless assured by the d'
fendant Local's president that he would be eligible for
full strike benefits. (R. 1006) Brehany took no excfi
tion to that assurance.

1

1

The trial court, having heard the evidence regarding
tJw defen<lanh;' a::;surances to plaintiffs that the claimed
$ICJ0.00 per month outside earning limitation had never
hrrn invoked and would not be invoked against plaintiffs, (•oncludt>d as a matter of law that the defendants
\\'ere e::;topped by such conduct from now invoking such
a limitation. ( R. 567 -568) r:ehe court further concluded
that by reason of that same conduct and the evidence
that other persons earning in excess of $150.00 per month
during the strike were paid full strike benefits, the defendants had effectively waived and abandoned their
1ight to invoke the claimed constitutional limitation. ( R.
:Jiii-5G8) ln an effort to counter these conclusions, defrndants argue that, since many of the plaintiffs posa copy of the B.L.F. & E. Constitution, no matl'rial facts were concealed from them, i.e., they could
have ascertained from reading the Constitution that out:-i1<le earnings may disqualify them from strike benefits.
Un the contrary, the evidence is clear that the defendants
to plaintiffs that, despite the lani;-nage of tlw constitutional provision on outside earnthP same had not in the past and would not now
hr invoked against the plaintiffs. (R. 787-880, 1002-1004)

Even assuming that plaintiffs knew of the claimed
onstitutional limitation, the critical thing unknown to
tlwrn \1·as that, not withstanding these B.L.F. & E assur:rncP" that the limitation had not and v,·ould not be inrnked, the Union would disregard such assurances and
attrmpt to invoke such a limitation against them. The
]ilaintiffs did not and could not reasonably have forethe defendants' flagrant breach of promise on that
'uh,j1>rt.
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Defendants have correctly interpreted tlw Jo<'tn 1,,
of waiver as involving the voluntary rPlirn1ui1>h1HPnt ,
a known right. However, tht>ir argunwnt
,,
11
clear record here that such voluntary rPlinquishment dii1
take place. Defendants certainl.\T knew of the elaiineil
''right" to limit strike benefits based upon oubidt- f'arn.
ings, sinep the same is contained in their own Constitu
tion. Furtht>rmore, the record is clear that dPf Pndantc
knew (1) that B.L.F. & E. me>mbers had earned in f'Xlb,
of $150.00 per month during prior strikes and had even
signed affidavits of that effect, (2) that B.L.F. & E.
n•presentatives were assuring plaintiffs that no ('()mt
tutional limitation would be invoked against thflli ,
they joined and thereafter during the period of a strlk1
earned in excess of $150.00 per month, and ( 3) that nUlu
erous members receiving strike benefits in the 19Gi-li
Kennecott strike had earnings exceeding $1f)0.00 Jh·I
month. (F.xhibit P-1, R. 158, 215, 878-880, 898, 929, 9:iJ
935, and 1002-1004)
1

Defendants, knowing of such matters and lrnrin,
taken no action to invoke the constitutional limitation in
the past or to counter the prPsent
that i·
would not be invoked in the future, cl('arl)T waived a11·
rPlinquished any right they might have had to
up 11'
that constitutional provision.
It is highly significant in this case that the rl1·!'Pnd
ants having learned long before the .Jul)' 15, 19G7 !'il1''
mencement of the Kennecott strike that plaintiff:; Ira•
hePn promised strike benefits regardless of their .i 11:
<-lassification, regardless of tlw election oufr011w. HI!·
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,

,"ardlc•ss of 01eir earnings during the strike period,

1

tiwe after acquiring that information and prior
to thi' strike, informed plaintiffs that they would not
, digihle for strike benefits.
111
'th

:I

]I{

J

Plaintiffs were induced by dPfendants to ;join the
H.L.F. K and thPreby gave up their rights to strike
fJl'nefits from their previous unions; plaintiffs were then
n·quirrd to pay dues to the B.L.F. & E. and to perform
pieket duty and other duties on its behalf. Having imposed these burdens upon plaintiffs, defendants then
ih·nied them strike benPfits at a time of extereme hardBecause of that hardship, which resulted from
rH1mdants' failure to pay the promised strike benefits,
a large number of plaintiffs were compelled to seek outvmployrnent and earnings. To allow dt'fendants to
no\r invoke any eonstitutional limitation grounded upon
those outside Parnings would 1wrmit defendants to profit
Imm thPir O\rn inexcusable misconduct and breach of
pronnse.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT, IN ALLOWING COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS TO CIRCULARIZE POTENTIAL PLAINTIFFS TO JOIN THE
CLASS, DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION.

r nder

R ulP 23, U tali Rules Civil Procedure (and
1 • former Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure),
tiJp
of the manner in which notice of a spurious
adion ma)' be circularized is left to the sound dis'Tf'finn of the trial court.
1 11
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The right of plaintiffs to circularize notice of a sr
• iu1
ious class action has been upheld in numerous e&h
E.g., Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. i:. Nisli'y, :]Ii
F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied sub nont., ll'wi
L Union Carbide and Carbon Co., 371 F.2<l 801
r ark v. Guaranty Trust Co., 1-13 F.2d 503, 529 (2nd Cu.
19-14) (dictum); Hormel 1.:. United States, 17 F.R.D.:lii:.
304-305 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Neither of the cases cited by defendants prolio·
authority for reversal of a decision to permit circulariza.
tion prior to trial. Judge "\Vyzanski, in Chenier t'. Tra;
sitron Electronics Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D.
1962), specifically recognized that a trial eourt
e1:.
powered to authorize circulation, but decided not !1111,
so in that case. Id. at 935.

In Escott 1.:. BarChris Construction Co., 28:3 F'. Su1i:
fi43 ( S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court declined to authori;.
circulation after jud.r;ment had bee11 1'1dered - a situ:
tion very different than that in th<> instant ca::;ti. lnc
dentally, ther<> is no support in the Escott
f,
defendants' contention that allowing "such solicitati111,
was not within the discretion of the trial judg-t>'' an
that to allow such notice would have been prejudicix
error.

1

POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN THE

MEASURE OF DAMAGES USED TO COMPUTE THE JUDGMENT.

1.

Defendants' Argument is Irrelevant Because
Plaintiffs Relied upon Representations made
by the BLF&E and the Terms of that Organization's Constitution as well as any "Apparent
Authority of Union Representatives."

Defendants' Point YII assumes that plaintiff relied
:inly upon dt:'fendants' representatives' apparent authorit.1 in entering into their contract with defendants. This
is not correct (Set> pp. -1-:2-!, supra). Inasmuch as dt>fendants' Pstoppel argument is based upon the asswnption that plaintiffs' reliance was upon union organizers'
apparent authority only, the point is not well taken.
2. Estoppel Being a Substitute for Consideration,
the Measure of Damages to a Plaintiff who has
Relied upon Defendants' Representations to his
Detriment as the Value of ·his Contract.
b;::-:top1wl is a substitute for eonsideration. Eaton v.

ll'11cuf_l.-t l'tah :2cl
395 P.2d 332 (1956); II WILLISTOX, COXTRACTS
553A; RES'rATKMENT, CONTRACTS,
90 (1932). Therefore, the measure of

duP a plaintiff establishing estoppel is the value
f hi" l'ontract.
CONTRACTS, 90,
1
F u111ples. TlH'l'P is no
in plaintiffs' cited
or elsewhere that a plaintiff's damages are lim;i,"d to thosp proximately caused hy his reliance.

11
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3. Plaintiffs Relied Upon Defendants' Representa.
tions, at Least to the Extent of Paying Dues
and Performing Strike Duty.
The trial court stated the ahov<· as a fin<linc•/:'"" o!' 1d1.
(p. 2fl, supra). Tlw aets plaintiff perforn1<'d ai 11111111

to adequate rt> liane<> to invokP tlH' dod ri rn · o l'
CON'l1RAC'L1 S 90, E.1·r1111zJ!cs; Fi;

cral Fi11r111ce Co. r. ll11111isto11, +O-t. P.:2d -t.G5 nYa"I.
19fi5); Zir 1'clrTisio11 r. Proqrn111s, !11c. /'.
Grocers of South CaroliJ1a, 11-t. S.E. 2d 78:3 (S.C.

POINT VIII.
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THIS ACTION IS NOT PREEMPTED BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT.
The statement ap1wari11g- at pag<· :->S of' <lPfrmla11t,
IH"i<'f that ""one of tlw fidd represPntatives of the Brother
hood arrogatPd to himsdf <'ontrol of th1· <'a111paig·11" ·
contrary to the evid<'ne<' and ineonsist<'nt with the pro]Jh
findings of the trial court that find an1pl<· 1-'ll]ipol't"
th<' reeord. (See Point I, See. +above). TIH' PvidPn1··
is that L. L. Iman, hrothPr-in-law of 11. K (;illwr1
Pn•sidt'nt of <lefrndant B.L.F. & E., eon<ln<'h•d till· "at
paign under the scrupulous iwn;onal su1H·n·il"io11 11!' \l 1
( ;j]bert, and that l\lr. Oil be rt was at all
fomili:! 1
with and in personal ehargl' of th<· earnpaig11. ( H. 11! 11
!)3, 119fi and Exhihits P-85 to P-135). Tlw claim enr
tained later in tlw same varagraph of dPfrn<lant'' hrii/
that thf' repn•sentation of paynwnt of strikP lwnrfit·
regardless of election result was mad" "latPr

111 t!i

1.11 ,1.ti" 11 cawpaign" i:-; e(fually inconsi:-;tent with the evidi·JJf'f' an<l \\ i th thP trial court's findings. (
Point I,
,'-'.e(-. (j n!JOn'.) ThP evidt>n('e is that this n•1Jl'esentation
l!IH<l1· !'10111 tht- im·<·ptio11 of th1· l'arnpaign and proyideil a material part of tit(' offer of rnPrnrwrship made
II\ tlw defrndants to <·a('lt of tlw plaintiffs. (R G71, lOGOlll anu
P-1, l l, :.21, -!1, 31, 1:2 and 1-!0).
l)dendants' pn·P111ption argmrn,nt is a "n'd herring."
!Jefrndants argtw that heeause tlwy ean cite no cause
'.iltich 111 tlwir Yi<'\\" involves the grant of rPlief similar
tr' th<· reli1·f granted in this ease, therefore, it must folin11 that su('h n•lit>f is not perrnissiblf::'. But surely the
c·onrt:'l'SP of tlw statt•rnt-nt is far more correct. Defendanb have not citt-d and eonnot ('ite a single ca:-;e holding
or
that eontrartual promisPs 11iadP in tlH· <·ontPxt of a union-organizing effort cannot lw PnforcPd
lwntu:<<' of s<mll' supposed conflict with national labor
p1li1·:-. D111 w.;· t:w trial plaintiffs' eounsd challenged
1ldtnrlants' f'oum;el to present such a case, and none
1ras fortlwoming.
jJJ of th<' eases decided
the Vnited States Supn·n11· ( 'omt and low1•r frdPral <'Onrts in which the so-

l'allPd ··prernPption" doetrine has been artirulatrd have
111volnd violations or dairned violations of Sertion S
11 1' ih" ;\ at1onal Labor Relations Act. None have inrnlnd conduct in the contPxt of organizing campaigns,
wlur·h <lo<"s not fall within thP purview of Section S, hut
11 1
l i('lt falls within tlw urview of Section 9 of that Act.
if dd\•ll(lants' prePrnption argument were wrll
1"tlllilPd, <1Pf Pndants eould eite at least onP rase in whieh

the argument has no much as been raised before, f1ar
ticularly in light of what defendants charartf'rize tli
"great number of representation disputes" that hait
occurred since the amendment of the National Labui
Relations Act.
The record m this case establishes that plaintif;·,
in an effort to determine whether or not defendant"
preemption argument had any merit, sought an officia
determination by filing a charge with the National Lahi,,
Relations Board. This is precisely what defendants elaii:
plaintiffs should have done, and this is precisely wha1
plaintiffs did. By letter dated April 2, 1968, tlw
tional Director for Region 27 of the National Labor
Relations Board refused to issue a com11laint on tl11
facts alleged in this action (a copy of plaintiffs' Colli
plaint herein having been appended to the chargP a,
filed), stating:
The above captioned case charging a violatior
under Section S of the Na ti on al Lahor Relatinr1'
Act, as amendPd, has been carefully investigatr<
and considered.
As a result of the investigation, it has lwen e1111
eluded that in the absence of any evidenct' tb
the unions' withdrawal of strike bt-nt>fits affret1
tlw employment status or job opportunitirs
collectivf> bargaining contract benefits of ell;
ployees, its conduct was not considered to rni 11
within the ambit of St-ction 8(h)(l)(A). [m1.
therefore, refusing to issue complaint in thii' 111:,
ter.
1

11

This determination, absent an appeal to tlw genrr:
counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, "1 11 ,:

:

c· J
8]J]J (1

<iPfendants did not undertake, constitutes a final
·inrl binding d!:'termination by the National Labor Rela;ions Board that the matters complained of in plaintiffs'
L'ouiplaint an· not within the purview of the Board's
(ttlministratiYe Jl°'''ers or the National Labor Relations
Act.

That determination by the National Labor Relations
Doard is clearly correct. Although the National Labor
Relations Board has authority under the National Labor
Helations Act to conduct elections to determine the deof employees with respect to their collective bargaining representatives, there is nothing in that act or
tlir decision then•under which in any manner supports
the def
assertion that such election powers predude state courts from enforcing contractual obligations
of unions or r!:'medying their tortious conduct. On the
contrary, in the leading case of International
hon of Jluchi11ists c. Gu11zales, 356 U.S. 617, 620, 78 S.
Ct. S2:i, 9:25 (19fiN), tl1e lTnitPd States Supreme Court
upheld the rights of union members to sue
theii' union in a state court for breach of contract. In
doi11g, tlw Court stated:
. . . The protection of wnion members in
their ri_qhts as nwmbrrs from arbitrary conduct
ln1 1111ions and 1wio11 officers has not been undertaken by federal lau', and indeed the a.ssertion of
(Illy such pou·er has uren expressly denied . . .

'rhus, to pr<'clude a state court from exerting its
traditional jurisdiction to determine and enforce
the rights of union membPrship ·would in many
ra::;e8 IPavP an unjustly ousted member without
r0mP<l>· for the restoration of his important union
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rights. Such a clrm;tic result, on the n·inoti
sibility of some entanglement with th(' !>Jl1J1'1I1'':'
enforcement of the national polie:I' would 1" 1 •
.
. d"
.
f
jlL,
a more eompe 11 mg m icat10n o eongTessiona! 1
than can be found in the interstiet•s of thl'
Hartley Act. ( 1£mphasis added)
'·
1

rrhe United States Supn•uw Court has eitl•d th(, Go 1i: 11 /,
('ase with approval in a number of recent cases,
Nation((l Labor Relations Board v. Allis-Chalmers J//,1
Co., 388 lT. S. 182, 87 S. Ct. 2001 (1967). In tlw Al/,
Chalmers case it was held that nothing in the f PdPn:
labor acts prevented a union from attempting to enfor1.,
in the state courts fines imposed upon ifa mPrnhH,
pursuant to the union's constitution. for crossing sud
union's picket lines during a strike. Certainly. if ti'
defendant unions can utilize the state courts to enfor1,
the provisions of their ocnstitution against tlwir rn1 1n
bern, plaintiffs, who are union members, should liki
wise be allowed access to the state courts to enforce thP11
rights against those unions.
1

The Gonzales doctrine, ·which sustains stafr corn·
jurisdiction over such "internal union matters," \\i'
also followed in Vaca, et al.. v. Sipes, 38G F S. lSO, ;;
S. Ct. 903 ( 1967). In the Vaca case, the Supreme Com:
held that the Missouri state eourt had jurisdiction 11!
a damage action brought against a union by a discharge 1
employee who alleged that lw had heen discltarµ:Pd i1'
violation of the collective bargaining contract, and tha'
his union had arbitrarily and without just eause refni1'
to take his grievance to arbitration under the contra11
The Court rejected the union's contPntion that tlw
court lacked jurisdiction because the gravanwn nf ti 1'
1
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·

-as argmahly and basically an unfair labor prac·
•
. ·tJ· ·n the exclm;ive jurisdiction of the National
II 1 11

*·t1nn
·.

fii·t'

1

,

1

,alior Relations Board.

rn

rejecting a similar contention that a state court
adion for damages arisin gfrom libelous conduct occurrint: dnring a union organization campaign was barred
subject to the Taft-Hartley Act, the Supreme
Court held:

''Vlhile the Board might find that an employer
or union violated Section 8 by deliberately making false statements or that the issuance of malicious statements during the organizing campaign
had surh a profound pffect on the election as to
require that it hr set aside, it looks only to the
eo1•rcive or misleading nature of the statements
rather than tllPir defamatory quality. Thf' injury
that th(• 8tatt>Itwnt might cause to an individual's
reputation - ·whether lH.' be an employPr or union
official - has no rf'levance to the Board's function. Li1111 1'. Plant Guards Local 114, 383 U.S. 60,
G3, SG 8. Ct. G57,
( 19GG).

rr'lw Court \\-ent on to say:
"'Th<• Board C'an m\·ard no damages, impose no
JH;nalt.\·. or give any otllPr relif'f to the defamed
in<liYidnal." Li11n r. Plant Guards, supra.
in tlw instant case, the Na ti on al Labor Relations Board could grant no reliPf to plaintiffs. Thus,
it was in·opt-rl)- ·within the province of the lowPr Court
to try this case and grant to plaintiffs the relief to which
tlJP>' were entitled.
This Court should not seriously Pntertain the artiir.,. and fnhrieated prPemption argument urged by de-
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fendants. 'rlw facts of this <:asp an· simple and iiwii[\,
no national labor policy
implications.
iii·
•
'
Oii:
ised that if plaintiffs joined defendants, tlwy ,,.0 ,
•
U111
receive certain benefits. Plaintiffs joined defenrlant
and paid substantial dues and otherwise supported df
fendants. Defendants broke faith with plaintiffs by fail
ing to fulfill the plan and indeed admitted promises mad,
to plaintiffs. (See Stipulation, R. 1060-61) Tlw tria;
court had no difficulty with this argument, recognizinz
easily a legal argument, fabricated out of wholP clot\,.
irrelevant to the issues of the case, and made in dPsJiera
tion in the face of an indefensible factual situation.
POINT IX
SECTION 501 OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT
OF 1959 IS NO DEFENSE TO THIS ACTION.
Defendants' Point IX, like Point VIII, is a desperat•
legal argument fabriiated because no factual defense i:
or can be made. It is more than sufficient amnrrr ti·
the convoluh·d reasoning of defondants' brief, JH'Pdieat11l
upon out-of-context quotations of thc> statute, to refe1
this Court to two other "clear and unequivocal''
of the same Act npon which defendants claim they rely.
Section 411(a)(4) of the Labor-Management Reportini
and Disclosure Act of 1959 provides as follows:
"No labor organization shall limit the right 11 !
any member therPof to institute an action in an\
court or in a proceeding before any administra
tive agency, irrespective of whetlwr or not thr
labor organization or its officers are named i'
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11te defendants or rt>spornlf·nh; m such action or
.
"
procee d mgs.
The sa111e Act. in s('Ction 523 (a) provide::; as follows :

"Except as explicitly provided to the contrary,
nothing in this aC't ::;hall rPduce or limit the responsi hi liti<>s of any labor organization or any
officer, ag<>nt, shop ::;te\\rnrd, or other representatiw of a labor organiaztion, or of any trust in
whieh a labor organization is interested, under
anY otlwr frderal law or under the laws of anv
and, except as explicitly provided to
contrary, 1wthing in this act shall take away any
riqht or bar any remedy to which members of a.
/a/J{Jr organization are entitled under such fedcrnl lair or laze of any state." (Emphasis added)
Deefndants' argument totally disregards these clear
]ll"OYisions of the statutes.
Evt>n if tht> statute werf> not in itself inconsistent
1rith dl'f'l'ndants' <'<>ntentions, those contf>ntions are irrelL·rant. They d<>1wnd Pntirely upon the notion, which is
1rhully without ::mpport in this reeord or in law, that
t11P
of strikP benefits to plaintiffs as admittedly
pnnn1sed hy defendants would violate defendants' ConIn :support of that argument, defendants cite
,\rtirlP 10, Seetion 3, paragraph (a) of that Constitution
(DPf. Brid', pagP 72) and argnP that plaintiffs did
nut t>ngagp in a legal strikt> authoriz(•d by def Pndants.
Tit(· Court should consider that claim. It is, of course,
not elaimed that plaintiffs did not participate in a strike.
Tl1Py did. lndPed, thP record not only shows that they
JiarticipatPd, hnt <>stablishes that they fulfilled assigned
Pif'kpt
for fl pf endants and otherwise satisfied each
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and every obliagtion of union memben;hip in conJ'un
•l,
' c li1]1
with that strike. (R. lOGl and Exhibits P-8, 11, Hi, lk ·Ji
rrhere is no claim that the strike was illPgal.
the last to claim that this strib_, was ill<·gal would 1,'
those who initiated it, namely, the defendant unions anrl
other unions at Kennecott. Nor can it be serious!;
claimed that the strike was not authorized by defendant;
(See Point I, 8Pc. 7 abon' for full discussion) The fat·
that defondants paid strik<> benefits to some of their
members engaging in this same strike, as the reriirrl
clearly establishes, should he
to Pstahli,lt 1
yond doubt that no claim is or can be made that defend
ants did not authorize the strike. ( R. 917-939 and fa
hibits P 179 to 84)
11

Accordingly, and contrary to the spurious argumen:
made in defendants' Point IX, plaintiffs as mt•rnlwri '·
deefndants did engage in a legal strike authorizP<l 11:
defendants, and like all of defendants' other nwrnlwr·
who engaged in said strike, are Pntitled to the :-tnK·
benefits provided to them under defendants' constitutir"
and promised to them but unjustly withhPld frolll
Clearly, the facts of this case require the conelusion t]w·
the vPry provisions of the Labor-Management Reportini
11
and Disclosure Act of 1959 upon which
J'P
have been violated by defendants in tht>ir wrongful M
arbitrary refusal to pay to plaintiffs the arlmitteill1
promised strike benefits. There neither is nor ean Ir
nnv merit whatever to the false contention that dPffnil
ants' payment of these benefits would violafr that Y
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CONCLUSION
'l1lw judgment below should be affirmed in all re,;rwcb sinl'e tlw findings of fact upon which it is based
are owrwhel111ingly supported by the evidence of record.
Furthrr, the trial court was correct in its finding that
a valiJ. contract existed for the payment of strike benefits to those plaintiffs who joined the defendant unions
nnd perfornwd the duties required of members.
The trial court correctly decided that it had juristliction to adjudicate this action to enforce the contract
rights of nnion members. Appellants' defense of ultra
clrcs, "special status" of trade unions, non-exhaustion of
renlPdies, wajver, incorrect measure of damages, etc.
gPnerally assume factual data not supported by the
C"ourt's findings of fact and are grounded upon an incortTd interpn·tation of the relevant law.

It is difficult to imagine an action which the fundanwntal ekments of justice and equity are more decisively
1111 the side of one party than they are here. The grava111t·11 of tl1e q1wstion before the court simply is this: Is
'l labor union situated as is the defendant Brotherhood
frf't' to haw its officers and/or representatives misrepre·'L'llt and dPeeiw· with impunity in recruiting and dealing
1
1ith inemhers, or may union members seek redress for
1i 11 lMi01rn of their contractual rights in courts of general
,juri1'did10n on the same terms as any other citizen 1
l':i state the question is to answer it.
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For the foregoing rea::;ons, plaintiffs resp('Ctful),
submit that the judgment entered by the trial roun i ,
affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGL:BW,
CORN\VALL & l\J cCAR'l'l1\

C. Keith Rooker
Richard W. Giauque
Ricardo B. Ferrari

Attorn<>ys for Pla.intiftsRespondents
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